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13.1  Introduction 
In the course of the last century, the United States rate of  net national 
savings as conventionally defined declined dramatically from over 20% in 
the 1880s to less than 8% in the 1970s. Over this same period, govern- 
ment expenditure rose from 7% to 22% of  GNP, the size of  the federal 
debt measured at book value excluding social security varied enormously 
from under 10% to over 90% of GNP  in particular years, and the level 
and structure of  taxes  changed  significantly.  While  economic theory 
provides qualitative predictions of  the effects of these changes in govern- 
ment policy  on national  savings, the quantitative importance of  these 
changes  is  little  understood. This paper develops a perfect  foresight 
general equilibrium simulation model of life-cycle savings that may be 
used to investigate the potential impact of a wide range of  government 
policies on national savings and economic welfare. While the strict life- 
cycle model of  savings has been questioned at both the theoretical (Barro 
1974) and empirical (Kotlikoff and Summers 1981) levels, the strict (no 
bequests) life-cycle model provides an important benchmark to  consider 
the range of  savings  and welfare  responses  to government policy  in 
general and deficit policy in particular. 
The simulation model can provide quantitative  answers to a number of 
long-standing questions  concerning the government’s influence on capital 
formation. These include the degree of  crowding out of private invest- 
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ment by  debt-financed increases in  government  expenditure, the dif- 
ferential effect on consumption of temporary versus more permanent tax 
cuts, the announcement effects of  future changes in tax and expenditure 
policy, and the response to structural  changes in the tax system, including 
both the choice of the tax base and the degree of progressivity. The model 
tracks the values of  all economic variables along the transition path from 
the initial steady-state growth path to the new steady-state growth path. 
Hence the model can be used to compute the exact welfare gains or  losses 
for each age cohort associated with tax reform proposals. Finally, the 
simulation experiments can  usefully  instruct  the specification of  time 
series consumption regression models that purport to estimate how gov- 
ernment policy alters national savings. 
This paper describes the technical structure of  the simulation model 
and the solution algorithm used to compute perfect foresight life-cycle 
growth paths. Four examples of  potential applications of  the model are 
briefly examined. These are an analysis of  the welfare costs of  capital 
income taxation, the incidence of the progressive income tax, the effect 
of fiscal policy on national savings, and the savings response of the private 
sector to early announcements of future tax policy changes. 
The principal findings from these applications of  the model are: 
1. The excess burden associated with the taxation of  capital income 
provides some limited scope for improving the welfare of  all current and 
future cohorts when lump-sum taxes and transfers are available. How- 
ever, given that lump-sum taxes and transfers are not available policy 
tools, “tax reform” proposals are likely to significantly reduce the welfare 
of some cohorts and significantly raise the welfare of  others  unless annual 
tax rates and their associated deficit levels are chosen with extreme care. 
2.  The intercohort allocation of the tax burden of  government expend- 
iture is a significantly more important determinant of  national savings 
than is the structure of  taxation. 
3. The long-run effect on the capital output ratio of switching from a 
progressive to a proportional income tax with no change in the stock of 
government debt is roughly 13%. 
4.  Short-run crowding out of  private investment by balanced budget 
increases in  government expenditure is on the order of  50 cents per 
dollar, while long-run crowding out is 20 cents per dollar of government 
expenditure. 
5. Temporary as well as more permanent tax cuts can lead to increases 
rather than decreases in national savings in the first few years following 
the enactment of the tax cut. This depends both on which taxes are cut 
and on which taxes are subsequently raised to finance interest payments 
on the associated deficit. 
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affect the national savings rate in periods prior to implementation of the 
legislation. 
The  welfare costs of capital income taxation, the effects of government 
deficit policy on capital formation, and the long-run incidence of alterna- 
tive tax instruments are the focus of  a growing body of economic litera- 
ture. While understanding of  these issues has been greatly enhanced in 
recent years, the literature remains seriously deficient with respect to a 
number of  theoretical and empirical concerns. The next section of  this 
paper provides a selected and brief review of this literature and points out 
those deficiencies that can be addressed with the model developed here. 
Section 13.3 develops life-cycle optimization conditions for both pro- 
portional and progressive wage, interest income, and consumption tax 
structures. The simulation methodology is described in  this section as 
well. Section 13.4 examines the welfare costs of capital income taxation, 
distinguishing pure efficiency issues associated with the structure of taxa- 
tion from the issue of  intercohort redistribution. Section 13.5 discusses 
the effect of  progressive taxation on national savings and describes the 
economic  transition  from  a progressive income tax  to a progressive 
consumption tax. Section 13.6 investigates the long- and short-run sav- 
ings impact of alternative government fiscal policies including temporary 
and more permanent tax cuts, changes in  the level of  government ex- 
penditure, and early announcements of  future changes in  tax policy. 
Section 13.7 summarizes the paper and suggests areas for future research. 
13.2  Selected Literature Review 
The long-run welfare implications of deficit policy and the choice of the 
tax base have been the focus of numerous recent articles (Feldstein 1974; 
Boskin 1978; Auerbach 1979; Kotlikoff 1979; Summers 1981; and Brad- 
ford 1980). These analyses have emphasized the welfare of cohorts living 
in the new steady state that results from alterations in government policy; 
little attention has been paid to the welfare of generations alive during the 
transition to the new steady state. This long-run focus has obscured the 
true scope for Pareto-efficient tax reform; to the unwary reader it may 
also convey the incorrect impression that deficit policy by  itself is in- 
efficient rather than simply redistributive. As this paper demonstrates, 
changes in government tax and expenditure policies may entail significant 
redistribution between cohorts alive today and in the indefinite future. 
The incidence of  these policies can be understood only by  examining 
changes in the welfare of all cohorts-transition  cohorts as well as cohorts 
living in the distant future when the economy converges to a new steady 
state. The pure efficiency gains from “tax reform” cannot be isolated by 
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welfare changes may reflect redistribution from other cohorts as opposed 
to the elimination of  excess burdens in the tax system. 
Summers’s stimulating study represents the sole attempt to explicitly 
examine the welfare of  transition cohorts. His simulation analysis sug- 
gested  that  proportional  wage  and  consumption  taxation  can  have 
markedly different long-run impacts despite the fact that the long-run 
structure of these two tax systems are identical. Summers demonstrated 
that the requirement that the government’s budget be balanced at each 
point in time implied a quite different intercohort distribution of  the tax 
burden of  financing government expenditure under the wage versus the 
consumption tax. While the long-run tax structures are identical under 
the two tax systems, the actual long-run tax rates are not. 
Summers’s analysis, while suggestive of many of the findings presented 
here, is based on the assumption of  myopic rather than rational expecta- 
tions; the transition path of  myopic life-cycle economies with respect to 
the size of  the capital stock and the level of  utility is likely to differ 
significantly from the perfect foresight rational expectations paths ana- 
lyzed here. In general, myopic expectation paths will exhibit too rapid a 
convergence to the new steady state since future general equilibrium 
changes in gross wage rates and rates of return are not taken into account 
in today’s consumption decisions; these future expected general equilib- 
rium changes tend to dampen initial behavioral responses to exogenous 
changes in government policy parameters. 
In addition to explicit steady state modeling, there have been a number 
of  recent calculations of  the efficiency costs of  capital income taxation 
(Feldstein  1978; Boskin  1978; Green and Sheshinski 1979; and King 
1980). While pointing  out a number of  the key determinants of  the 
potential inefficiencies associated with the taxation of  capital income, 
these analyses are deficient in four respects: 
1. The calculations are partial equilibrium, assuming that gross factor 
returns  are not  affected by  compensated changes in  the structure of 
taxation; this may be a convenient expositional device but gives incorrect 
estimates of  excess burden. 
2.  Very simple models of life-cycle behavior are used, in which indi- 
viduals live and consume for two periods, working in the first period only. 
Once again, this simplification may be useful for some purposes but is 
certainly a poor description of actual life-cycle behavior. One problem is 
that the first-period labor supply assumption implies that changes in the 
interest rate have no impact on the present value of resources. Summers 
(1981) found that the size of the uncompensated elasticity of savings with 
respect to the interest rate depends critically on the magnitude of future 
labor earnings. The compensated elasticity of consumption is presumably 
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3.  These “triangle” calculations ignore the fact that any actual transi- 
tion from one tax system to another must begin when some individuals 
are partway  through  life. While these calculations make some sense 
under the assumption that cohort-specific tax schedules could be intro- 
duced in switching from one tax regime to another, they make little sense 
under the realistic assumption that cohort-specific  tax instruments are not 
available. The scope for Pareto-efficient tax reform may be greatly re- 
duced when the set of alternative tax instruments is restricted to realistic, 
noncohort specific tax schedules. 
4. These analyses study transitions between systems of  proportional 
taxation, while both  current  and prospective  tax systems are in fact 
progressive. It is not clear that a switch from a progressive income tax to a 
progressive tax on annual consumption would improve efficiency,  even if 
such were the case for a switch from a proportional income tax to a 
proportional  consumption tax. If  individual consumption profiles rise 
with age, a progressive consumption tax implies rising marginal rates of 
tax on future relative to current consumption, thus mimicking a tax on 
capital income.  Moreover, if  the progressivity of  each  tax is chosen 
according to a desire to maintain a certain degree of  equality in society, 
tax rates may be substantially more progressive under an annual con- 
sumption tax than under an income tax. 
Each  of  these  deficiencies may  have  an  important  effect  on  the 
measurement  of  the potential gains to society in  switching from  the 
current tax system to one that fully exempts capital income from taxation. 
Empirical investigations of the effects of  government policy on capital 
formation have relied primarily on time series regression models. Feld- 
stein’s (1974) and Barro’s (1978) analyses of the effects of social security 
on savings and Boskin’s (1978) estimation of  the “interest elasticity of 
saving” provide examples of  standard time series procedures. Variables 
over which the government has some control such as the level of  social 
security benefits or the current net rate of  return are used in a regression 
explaining aggregate consumption. In addition to social security variables 
and the net interest rate, the candidates for “exogeneous” variables have 
included current disposable income, the stock of  private wealth, the level 
of  the government deficit, and the level of  government expenditure. 
As tests of  the effects of  government policy on savings in a life-cycle 
model, these regressions are subject to a number of  criticisms. 
1. The theoretical coefficients  of the variables included in these regres- 
sions are functions not only of preferences but also of current and future 
values of capital income and consumption tax rates as well as current and 
future gross rates of  return. Hence, even if  government policy remains 
constant over the period of  estimation, the coefficients cannot be ex- 
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tax rates will vary over time as the economy proceeds along its general 
equilibrium growth path toward a steady state. 
2.  Since the coefficients incorporate current and future tax rates as 
well as underlying intertemporal consumption preferences, the estimated 
coefficients cannot be used to analyze changes in government policy that 
will necessarily alter the time path of future tax rates and gross rates of 
return. This is the Lucas critique and is particularly applicable to Boskin’s 
(1978) study, which contemplates switching from our income tax regime 
to a completely different tax regime, namely a consumption tax. 
3. Total consumption is the aggregate of  consumption of  cohorts of 
different ages. Since in a life-cycle model the marginal propensity  of 
cohorts to consume out of their total net future resources differs by age, 
the coefficients in the aggregate consumption regression will be unstable 
if  the distribution of  future resources changes over time. This is clearly 
the case for the private net worth variable in the social security regres- 
sions. 
4.  The regressions  use  proxy variables such as disposable income 
instead of the present value of net human wealth in the actual estimation. 
Since disposable income is correlated with each of the other variables in 
the regressions this problem of  errors in the variables is likely to impart 
bias in each coefficient of  the regression. 
5. Despite the fact that some variables included in the regression do 
not affect aggregate consumption linearly, linearity is forced on the data. 
Each of  these critiques can be explored with the simulation model de- 
veloped here. We intend to simulate particular policy alternatives and 
thereby  produce  “simulated”  data. These  data will  then  be  used  in 
regressions following the specifications found in the literature. The esti- 
mated coefficients will provide an indication of  what economic theory 
actually predicts about these coefficients  in a truly controlled experiment. 
For example, the estimated coefficients on social security wealth ob- 
tained from these regressions might well prove to be negative, while the 
data were obtained from a model in which social security dramatically 
lowers the capital stock. 
13.3  The Model and Its Solution 
We model the evolution over time of an economy composed of govern- 
ment, household, and production sectors. The household sector is, at any 
given time, made up of  fifty-five overlapping generations of individuals. 
Each person lives for fifty-five years, supplying labor inelastically for the 
first forty-five of these years and then entering retirement.’ Members of a 
1. Chamley (1980, 1981) provides a careful and extensive discussion of  the welfare 
implications of  the tax structure and public debt in an intertemporal model of  altruistic 
behavior. 
2. This is intended to model a typical household that “appears” at age twenty, retires at 
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given generation may differ in their endowments of human capital but are 
assumed to be identical in all other respects. To reflect observed wage 
profiles, the human capital endowment of  each individual grows at a fixed 
rate h. The population as a whole grows at rate n. 
As stated above, each household is a self-contained unit, engaging in 
life-cycle consumption behavior with no bequests. Because labor is sup- 
plied inelastically, the labor-leisure choice is not considered. We assume 
the lifetime utility of each household takes the form 
where C, is the household’s consumption at the end of its tth year, and p 
and y are, respectively, taste parameters characterizing its pure rate of 
time preference (degree of  “impatience”) and the inverse of  the partial 
elasticity of  substitution between any two years’ consumption. A large 
value of  p indicates that the individual will consume a greater fraction of 
lifetime resources in the early years of  life and would lead to a lower 
aggregate rate of  savings. A large value of  y indicates a strong desire to 
smooth consumption in different periods. In the extreme, when y equals 
infinity, the household possesses Leontief indifference curves and there is 
no substitution effect on consumption behavior. 
The individual maximizes lifetime utility (1) subject to a budget con- 
straint, the exact specification of  which depends on the particular tax 
system in force. For a progressive income tax, the individual’s lifetime 
budget constraint is 
where ti and w, are the gross payments to capital and labor at the end of 
year t,  e,  is the labor supplied in year t,  and TYt  is the average tax rate on 
income faced by the household in year t. 
By constructing a Lagrangean from expressions (1) and (2),  and dif- 
ferentiating with respect to each Ct,  we obtain the first-order conditions: 
where  A  is the Lagrange multiplier of  the lifetime budget constraint, 
(4) 466  Alan J. AuerbachJLaurence  J. Kotlikoff 
and T~~  is the marginal income tax rate in year t. To understand these 
first-order  conditions, consider first the proportional tax case, where 
marginal and average tax rates are the same. In this case, 8, = 1, and (3) 
dictates that the marginal utility of consumption in year t should equal the 
marginal utility of lifetime resources A times the implicit price of a dollar 
of year t consumption in year one dollars. With progressive taxes, Or is less 
than one and represents a reduction in the implicit price of  year t con- 
sumption. This additional term reflects the fact that an increase in con- 
sumption in year twill reduce income from assets in all future years and 
thus reduce all future average tax rates.3 
Combination of  condition (3) for successive values off implies 
This "transition equation" indicates how preferences and the tax struc- 
ture interact to determine the shape of  life-cycle consumption patterns. 
First, note that, as y grows, time preference and tax factors play a smaller 
role in determining the ratio of  C,  to C,- 1; at y = m, C,  =  C,  -  regardless 
of other parameter values. For finite values of y, the rate of consumption 
growth increases with an increase in the net interest rate and decreases 
with an increase in the rate of  pure time preference. 
It is important to remember that equation (5) determines only the 
shape of the consumption growth path, not its level. To obtain the latter, 
we apply (5) recursively to relate C,  to C1 for all t, then substitute the 
resulting expression for C, into the budget constraint (2) to obtain the 
following expression for C1 in terms of  lifetime resources: 
is the proportion of  lifetime resources consumed in the first year. 
ing to (2) is 
For a progressive consumption tax, the budget constraint correspond- 
s  [ I; (1 + 4  -lw,e, 
I=1  s=2 
2  r=1  2  [  s=2  I!I (1 ++1  +7,,)Cr, 
3. The term 8,  corrects for the present-value change in taxes assessed on the stream of 
income arising from a change in average tax rates. In a one-period setting, letting  f stand for 
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where Tct  is the average tax rate on consumption in year t. The conditions 




(T,,  is the marginal tax rate on consumption in year t).  A comparison of 
(5)  and (5') indicates that, in its influence on the consumption path, a 
progressive consumption tax with marginal rates increasing over time has 
a similar influence on the shape of the consumption path as a progressive 
income tax. If the progressive consumption tax is levied on annual rather 
than lifetime consumption, then  is  a function of  C,.  From (5') it is clear 
that T~~?T~~-~  as r,zp. Hence the steeper the growth of consumption in 
the absence of  taxes, the greater will be the relative taxation of  future 
consumption under an annual progressive consumption tax. 
Explicit presentation of  the optimizing behavior of households under 
other tax systems is omitted since the derivation of  these results from 
those just presented follows in a straightforward manner. 
The economy's single production sector is characterized by the Cobb- 
Douglas production function: 
(7)  x=AK;((l  +g)'L,)'-', 
where x,  K,, and L,  are output, capital, and labor at time t,  A is a scaling 
constant, g is an exogenous productivity growth rate, and E is the capital 
share of output, assumed throughout the paper to equal 0.25. Lt  is simply 
equal to the sum of labor endowments of all individuals in the work force. 
K,  is generated by a recursive equation that dictates that the change in the 
capital stock equals private plus public savings. Competitive behavior on 
the part of  producers ensures that the gross factor returns r, and w, are 
equated to the marginal products of  capital and labor at time t: 
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implies that the market value of  capital goods always equals their repro- 
duction cost; i.e. adjustment of  capital to the desired levels is instan- 
taneous. 
The government in our model needs to finance a stream of consump- 
tion expenditures, labeled G,,  that grows at the same rate as population 
plus productivity. For simplicity, the impact of government expenditures 
on individual utility is not considered in the analysis. Aside from various 
taxes, the government has at its disposal one-period  debt which  is  a 
perfect substitute for capital in household portfolios. This enables the 
government to save (run surpluses) and dissave (run deficits) without 
investing directly. If Ag,  is defined as the value of  government's  assets 
(taking a negative value if  there is a national  debt), government  tax 
revenue at the end of  period t is 
(9) 
where Fyr and Fc, are the aggregate  average tax rates on income and 
consumption, respectively, calculated as weighted averages of  individual 
average tax rates. Given the government's ability to issue and retire debt, 
its budget constraint relates the present value of its expenditures to the 
present value of its tax receipts plus the value of its initial assets: 
(10)  Ago+  r=O [  s=O  h (l+r,)]-'Rl 
=  r=O  ? [  s=O  h (1+4)]-'Gr. 
(Note that G, corresponds  to  a different concept from that reported in the 
National Income Accounts, which  includes  government  purchase  of 
capital goods.) 
The solution method used to compute the perfect foresight general 
equilibrium path of the economy depends on the type of policy change 
being examined. In general, one may distinguish two cases. In the first, 
the ultimate  characteristics of  the economy are known,  and the final 
steady state to which the economy converges after the policy change is 
enacted may be described without reference to the economy's transition 
path. An example of such a policy change is the replacement of  a system 
of  income taxation with a tax on consumption, subject to year-by-year 
budget balance. The configuration of  taxes and the government debt in 
the final steady  state is known here. Thus it is possible to solve for the final 
steady state and then use our knowledge of  the initial and final steady 
states to solve for the economy's transition path. 
The second class of  problems is one where a policy involves specific 
actions during the transition and the final steady state  cannot be identified 
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policy which specifies a ten year cut in income taxes, compensated for by 
concurrent increases in the national debt, with the debt per capita held 
constant thereafter and a new constant rate of  income tax ultimately 
established, it is impossible to solve for this new rate without also know- 
ing the level of  per capita debt which is established  in the transition. 
Here, it is necessary to solve for the final steady state and transition path 
simultaneously. 
The actual solution for the economy’s behavior over time always begins 
with a characterization of  the initial steady state, given initial tax struc- 
ture and government  debt. We  assume  that individuals of  different 
generations alive during this steady state  correctly perceive the tax sched- 
ule and factor prices they will face over time, and behave optimally with 
respect to these conditions. We utilize a Gauss-Seidel iteration technique 
to solve for this equilibrium, starting with an initial guess of  the capi- 
tal-labor ratio (KIL),  deriving from each iteration a new estimate used to 
update our guess and continuing the procedure  until  a fixed point  is 
reached. Given the method of deriving new estimates of KIL, such a fixed 
point corresponds to a steady-state equilibrium. 
The iteration step is slightly different for each type of  tax system, but 
the following description of  how it proceeds for a progressive income tax 
should be instructive. (In this example, we assume each generation is 
composed of  one representative individual. In the actual simulations, we 
sometimes allow cohorts to have heterogeneous members.) A schematic 
representation is provided in figure 13.1. In the first stage, a guess is made 
of  the capital-labor ratio (equivalent to a guess of the capital stock, since 
labor supply is fixed). Given the marginal productivity equations (8a) and 
(8b), this yields values for the wage  w and interest rate r. Combining 
these values with initial guesses for the paths of marginal and average tax 
rates over the life cycle, we apply equations (3) and (6)  to obtain the 
life-cycle consumption plan of the representative individual C.  From the 
definition of  savings, this yields the age-asset profile A,  which may be 
aggregated (subtracting any national debt assumed to exist) to provide a 
new  value  of  the capital stock and capital-labor ratio.  The age-asset 
profile, along with the estimates of  w and r,  also provides a solution for 
the age-income profile, which, in turn, dictates the general level at which 
taxes must be set (typically one parameter is varied in the tax function) to 
satisfy the government budget constraint and hence the new values of 
marginal  and average tax  rates faced  over the life  cycle,  T~ and 7,,, 
respectively. When the initial and final values of KIL and the tax rates are 
the same, this implies that the steady state has been reached. 
Solution for the final steady state, when this may be done separately 
(the first case discussed above), proceeds in a similar manner. In such a 
case, the transition is solved for in the following way. We assume the 
transition  to the new  steady state takes  150 years,  then  solve simul- ------  c---- 1 
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taneously for equilibrium in each of the 150 years of the transition period 
under the assumption that everyone believes that after year 150 the new 
steady state will obtain. This solution method is necessary because each 
household is assumed to take the path of  future prices into account in 
determining its behavior. Hence the equilibrium that results in later years 
will affect the equilibrium in earlier years. Specifically, we assume that 
individuals born  after the transition begins know  the transition path 
immediately and that those born before the beginning of  the transition 
behaved up to the time of  the change in government policy as if  the old 
steady state would continue forever. At the time of the announcement of 
a new policy to be instituted either immediately or in the near future, 
existing cohorts are “born again”; they behave like members of the new 
generation except that their horizon is less than fifty-five years, and they 
possess initial  assets as a result  of  prior  accumulation.  An iteration 
technique is used again, but here we must begin with a vector of  capital 
stocks (one value for each year) and two matrices of tax rates (two vectors 
for each year). Further, we cannot simply solve for the behavior of  a 
representative cohort, but rather must calculate the behavior of  each 
cohort alive during the transition. This procedure, while conceptually no 
more difficult than that used to find the steady states, requires consider- 
ably more computation.  As the ultimate paths converge to the final 
steady state well before year 150, the assumption about conditions after 
year 150 does not influence our results. 
When the final steady state may not be calculated independently from 
the transition path, the two stages are combined. Rather than calculate 
the final steady state, we simply calculate an “augmented” transition path 
lasting 205 years, where the final 55 years are constrained to have the 
characteristics of  a steady state. 
13.4  The Welfare Costs of Capital Income Taxation 
The ultimate impact on the economy of  a change in government policy 
depends on three key factors. First, the intercohort allocation of the total 
tax burden of financing government expenditures will determine the level 
of  tax rates and have important income effects on the consumption of 
particular cohorts. Second, the tax structure (choice of  tax base) offers 
the vector of prices each generation faces. Third, preferences determine 
each household’s response to a change in incentives. In the case of  a 
heterogeneous population, the intragenerational distribution of the tax 
burden may also be an important determinant of the growth path of  the 
economy. 
Typically, the impact of  tax policy has been studied most closely in 
partial equilibrium, static models in which the welfare of a representative 
individual  is  evaluated  under  alternative  tax  regimes.  As  discussed 472  Alan J. AuerbachILaurence J.  Kotlikoff 
above, this approach does not permit a study of the inefficiency involved 
during the transition from one steady state to another, nor does it tell us 
about the intergenerational transfers that may accompany the transition. 
For such issues to be studied, one must use a model in which overlapping 
generations exist and the change in tax regime is not considered as an 
exercise in comparative statics but rather as an explicit policy change that 
evolves over time. 
The classic study of  the static type just discussed is that of  Feldstein 
(1978), who examines the welfare gain from switching to a consumption 
tax or a tax on labor income alone from one on labor and interest income. 
As Feldstein points out, the choice between taxing labor income and 
taxing consumption at a constant  rate sufficient to produce  an equal 
present-value  revenue  yield  has  no effect  on the path of  individual 
behavior. Thus, if government uses debt finance to undo any differences 
in the timing of tax collections, there is no difference in national savings 
either, since both private and public consumption are identical under the 
two systems. All that differs is the distribution of  savings between the 
household and government sectors, with the government saving more 
under a wage tax because of  the earlier receipt of  tax revenues. 
When there is only one generation under study, it is impossible to 
imagine a change in individual lifetime tax burden without a concomitant 
change in government expenditures. However, once several generations 
are considered simultaneously, it is possible to allow tax burdens to be 
shifted across generations as the structure of taxation changes. For exam- 
ple, a switch from wage taxation to consumption taxation which requires 
not equal present-value  yield  per generation  but  rather year-by-year 
budget  balance will change the tax burden of  each generation in the 
transition to the new long-run steady state. To see why this is so, consider 
a simple model in which there is no growth in population or government 
expenditures and each individual lives for two periods, working only in 
the first and consuming only in the second. In the long run, if there is no 
government debt or deficit, the tax paid on consumption by each indi- 
vidual in his second year must equal the amount which would be paid in 
the first year under a wage tax. As long as the interest rate is positive, this 
involves a lower present value of  taxes and, because relative prices are 
the same under the two systems, a gain in long-run utility.  This result 
carries through to  a more general model, with individuals living, working, 
and consuming for several years, as long as wages occur earlier in life, on 
average, than  does consumption.  Thus Summers (1981) found  that, 
holding government revenue per year fixed, steady-state utility is sub- 
stantially higher under a consumption tax than under a wage tax. 
But this gain is not due to increased efficiency, since by such a criterion 
the two systems are equal (and completely nondistortionary with a fixed 
labor supply). What is occurring is a transfer from transitional genera- 473  National Savings, Economic Welfare, and the Structure of  Taxation 
tions to those in the steady state. In the simple example used above, if 
there were an immediate switch to a consumption tax, all generations 
would be better off  except the first, which would pay its taxes twice and 
therefore be worse off. As long as the economy is not on a path which is 
“dynamically inefficient” in the sense that conducting such a chain trans- 
fer in reverse would make all generations better off  (as would be true if 
the growth rate of  annual tax revenues exceeded the interest rate), such 
steady-state differences do not provide a fair comparison, because im- 
plicit in them is an intergenerational realignment of the tax burden. 
One could respond to this problem by requiring that government debt 
policy be used to  neutralize any such intergenerational  transfers, but this 
may  still fall short of  equating the effect  of  consumption  and wage 
taxation on all generations. Consider again a simple example with indi- 
viduals laboring in their first period and consuming in their second, and 
suppose the economy initially faces a wage tax. A complete neutraliza- 
tion of a switch to a consumption tax would require an exemption of  the 
first generation from consumption taxation (they have already paid the 
wage tax under the old system) with revenues in that year being paid for 
by deficit finance. Thereafter, each period’s consumption tax receipts 
would redeem the previous period’s debt. 
However, if, for example, we extended the model to allow individuals 
to consume in both periods, this policy  would  no longer  suffice,  for 
exempting the older generation from consumption taxes would exempt 
the younger generation’s first-period consumption as well. Thus a com- 
plete separation of  tax structure from intergenerational  transfers would 
appear to require not only an unconstrained use of  debt policy but the 
ability to assess age-specific tax rates as well.  In the absence of  such 
instruments, it  may  be impossible  to go  from  one tax  system  to an 
“equivalent” one  without having real effects on the welfare of individuals 
in the transition. 
Constraints on the set of  tax instruments limit our ability not only to 
move between structurally equivalent tax systems without changing the 
distribution of  cohort welfare but also to move to a priori less distortion- 
ary tax structures in a Pareto-efficient manner. Indeed, use of the limited 
set of  tax instruments themselves may  generate distortions along the 
transition path. One example here is transition to a consumption tax, to 
the extent that annual consumption tax rates change during the transi- 
tion. These tax rate changes will introduce distortions in the intertempo- 
ral consumption choice of  affected cohorts. In such a case, it may be 
possible to improve the welfare of all generations, but it is not obvious 
what the appropriate government policy is to accomplish this, given the 
limitation on generation-specific tax rates. In this case, requiring that the 
present value of  taxes be unaffected by the change in tax structure does 
not provide a guide to choosing a Pareto-efficient tax transaction since 474  Alan J. AuerbachILaurence J. Kotlikoff 
interest rates will be changing over the transition and there is no “cor- 
rect” interest rate to use in  the present value calculations. 
We turn now to the results of some simple simulations to demonstrate 
some of  the points just made. 
In the following example, we consider the transition paths of an econ- 
omy that starts at an initial steady state with a proportional wage tax of 
0.2 and a proportional interest income tax of 0.4 and switches to either a 
pure consumption tax or a pure wage tax. The government’s budget is 
assumed to be balanced each year; hence annual revenues are the same in 
both transitions. Individual utility parameters p and y are set at 0.02 and 
1,  respectively. The population grows at a rate n = 0.01, while individual 
human capital is assumed to grow at an annual rate of  h = 0.007. In 
addition, we assume a constant productivity growth rate of g = 0.02. The 
tax rates on capital and labor and the parameters n,  h,  andg  are chosen to 
accord with empirically observed magnitudes,  while  p and y provide 
reasonable results for the age-consumption profile and capital-output 
ratio in the initial steady state. Nevertheless, the results should be seen as 
illustrative and specific magnitudes viewed with some care. 
Some steady-state results of  the simulation are summarized in table 
13.1. From a capital-output ratio of 2.92 and a savings rate of 10% under 
the income tax, the economy goes to a moderately higher value of  each 
under  a wage  tax  (3.97 and  13.5%, respectively),  but  the shift to a 
consumption tax goes much further: the capital-output ratio is more than 
double under a consumption tax. It appears from these results that the 
change in efficiency of  a tax structure may be less important in determin- 
ing the characteristics of  the ultimate steady state than the coincident 
intergenerational transfers. To see the effect of such transfers, consider 
figure 13.2, which presents the change in welfare for each generation 
between each of  the two new systems and the status quo in which the 
income tax is  kept in  place.  The welfare change is  measured  by  the 
percentage increase or decrease in the vector of household consumption 
chosen under the initial tax system necessary to reach the level of utility 
attained under the new tax system. VC represents the gain in welfare 
under  a consumption  tax, and VW  the gain under  a wage tax. The 
Table 13.1  Income, Wage, and Consumption Taxes: Steady States 
(p=.02, r=l) 
Tax System 
Income  Wage  Consumption 
Capital-output  ratio  2.92  3.97  7.16 
Gross interest rate  .086  .063  ,035 
Aggregate savings rate  ,100  .135  ,244 
Tax rate  .40/.20  .30  .32 475  National Savings, Economic Welfare, and the Structure of  Taxation 
horizontal  axis indexes the individual generations,  with  generation  1 
being born at the beginning  of  the period  in  which  the changes  are 
enacted. As  is  clear  from the graph, though  steady-state welfare  is 
improved under each tax change, there are losing generations along the 
way. Moreover, the identity of  such generations, as well as the size of 
the ultimate steady-state welfare gain, is very different under the two 
regimes. 
For a switch to  wage taxation, retired generations, as well as those soon 
to retire, gain because the bulk of  their remaining income and tax liability 
under the income tax would be in the form of interest income and taxes on 
such income. Individuals born soon before or soon after the tax change 
are hurt. To understand why, it helps to consider the path of  capital stock 
growth under the wage tax, relative to the baseline economy, depicted in 
figure 13.3 as KW. (The corresponding path for the consumption tax is 
labeled KC.) Note that while the capital stock is eventually 50% larger, 
this higher level is not reached for several years. Thus, while the added 
capital will eventually lead to an increase in real wages, this rise will not 
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Fig. 13.3  Capital for wage and consumption taxes. 
occur immediately.  Moreover, as the revenue lost from removing the 
interest income tax must be made up by an increase in the wage tax, net 
real wages decline substantially in early transition years. 
The move to a consumption tax has very different effects. All genera- 
tions older than twenty at the time of enactment lose, because they have 
paid labor income taxes when young and will now have to pay consump- 
tion taxes when old. The maximum loss of  about 2.5% of  lifetime re- 
sources for individuals ages forty-five at the time of enactment represents 
a very large loss during this cohort’s remaining  years-consumption taxes 
are on the order of  40%  in  the earliest  transition  years,  more than 
doubling the tax liability for such individuals relative to the old system. 
These losses are greater in total than those under a wage tax, but so are 
the eventual gains for succeeding generations. The  implicit transfers from 
the old allow generations born as soon as five years into the transition to 
enjoy a 12% increase in real wealth, with an ultimate steady-state in- 
crease of 22%. 
A  response to these findings  concerning welfare  changes  under a 477  National Savings, Economic Welfare, and the Structure of Taxation 
consumption tax might be to accept the prospect that some generations 
will lose and that, for any plausible discount rate applied to the gains of 
succeeding generations, the social gain must be quite positive. This is the 
argument  made  by  Summers  (1981).  On the  other  hand,  such  an 
approach would also appear to favor a consumption tax over a wage tax, 
judging by the welfare comparison in figure 13.2, so  it is questionable 
what role, if  any, is being played by pure efficiency gains. 
Following  Phelps and Riley  (1978),  another way  of  attacking  this 
problem is to require that other measures accompany the tax change to 
ensure that no generation be harmed. Without lump-sum transfers, such 
a policy probably requires a combination of  deficit policy and the use of 
wage as well as consumption  taxes. In figure 13.4, the welfare path of one 
such policy, labeled VPARETO, is presented, along with the paths VC 
and VW from figure 13.2. Figure 13.5 presents the corresponding capital 
growth paths. The policy depicted involves starting with a wage tax of 
23% and a consumption tax of 9%,  gradually lowering the wage tax over 
fifty years to 15% while raising the consumption tax to 18%,  and running 
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Fig. 13.5  Capital stock under a Pareto-superior plan. 
deficits over the same period. The welfare path resembles that of  a wage 
tax, except that generations older than twenty at the time of enactment 
gain less and all other generations do better. The use of  deficit policy and 
wage taxation causes the capital stock to reach a value well below that 
attained under a pure consumption tax. 
Although this “Pareto path” is not unique, it demonstrates  two impor- 
tant results. First, even without a full complement of instruments at the 
disposal of  government, the long-run efficiency gains of  exempting capit- 
al income from taxation  are large enough to allow all generations to 
benefit. Of  equal importance, the ultimate steady-state gain is only about 
one-third the gain under a pure consumption tax. Thus one may loosely 
attribute about two-thirds of  the long-run welfare gains of switching to a 
consumption tax to coincident intergenerational  transfers  and the re- 
mainder to tax efficiency. As this result is for a model with a fixed labor 
supply, it is if anything an overstatement of the real efficiency gains to be 
had under such a change in tax regime. 479  National Savings, Economic Welfare, and the Structure of  Taxation 
13.5  Progressive Taxation 
The previous section of  the paper focused on the transition from a 
system of  proportional income taxation to alternative systems of  pro- 
portional taxation. In reality, the United States tax system is progressive 
(at least as measured by statutory tax rates) and it is likely that any new 
tax system would possess this characteristic as well. 
In considering the additional influence of tax progressivity ,  we alter our 
existing model in a number of ways. To facilitate the more complicated 
simulations necessary we ignore growth of  human capital or  productivity. 
(These parameters were found to have minor effects on the nature of 
transitions under proportional taxation.) As progressive taxes exist in 
part to mitigate the inequality of  resource distribution in society, it is 
important to  allow for the existence of heterogeneous individuals. This is 
accommodated in a simple manner, by assuming that each cohort has 
three representative individuals, with equal tastes but unequal incomes. 
Letting the median individual have an annual labor endowment of  1.0, 
the poor household is assumed to possess an endowment of  0.5, and the 
wealthy one an endowment of  1.5. Our final change is in the tax system 
itself.  We replace  the different systems of  proportional taxation with 
two-parameter progressive taxes; that is, if  z is the relevant tax base, we 
choose two parameters, labeled ci  and p, and set the marginal tax rate 
equal to a  + pz for all values of  z. It follows that the corresponding 
average tax rate is  a  + %pz. Setting  p = 0 amounts to proportional 
taxation. Highly progressive tax systems are represented by low values of 
a  and high values of  p.  For the simulations of  this section, the parameters 
from the basic proportional tax simulations above are maintained (y = 1, 
p = 0.02, n = 0.01); a  and p are set equal to 0.12 and 0.14, respectively, 
for the progressive income tax. These values of  a  and p were obtained 
from a least squares regression of  the marginal tax rates contained in the 
United States tax code, with income normalized to correspond to the 
levels in our simulations. 
Table 13.2 gives the marginal and average tax rates which result in the 
steady state under progressive  income taxation. For the poor person, 
marginal tax rates rise from 0.19 to 0.24, then dropping to 0.17 upon 
retirement and to 0.13 in the last year of  life. The corresponding values 
for the median and wealthy households are (0.26, 0.34,  0.20, 0.13) and 
(0.33, 0.43, 0.22, 0.13), respectively.  This tax structure would be ex- 
pected to reduce the inequality in society, but changing marginal rates 
might cause inefficiencies in excess of  the tax  wedges introduced  by 
equal-revenue proportional taxes. These two propositions are verified by 
examining the results of  a switch from progressive to proportional  income 
taxation. The poor in the long run have their real wealth (as measured 
above) reduced by 7.00%; the rich gain in wealth by 6.37%, and the 480  Alan J. AuerbachiLaurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 13.2  Simulated Tax Rates under Progressive Income Taxation 
Poor  Median  Wealthy 









































































































































































































































































































































,166 481  National Savings, Economic Welfare, and the Structure of  Taxation 
Table 13.2 (cont.) 
Poor  Median  Wealthy 

















,140  .187  ,153  ,205  ,162 
,138  ,181  ,150  ,197  ,158 
.I36  ,174  ,147  ,188  ,154 
,134  ,166  ,143  .  I79  ,149 
,132  ,158  .I39  ,168  .I44 
.129  ,150  ,135  ,157  ,139 
,126  ,140  ,130  ,146  ,133 
.I23  .I30  .125  .I33  ,126 
median group ia virtually unaffected (their wealth loss is 0.45%). This 
may very well represent a large loss in social welfare, taking distribution 
into account. However, it is clearly a gain in efficiency, since the propor- 
tional wealth gain of the rich is calculated on a much larger base than the 
proportional loss of the poor. This is corroborated by the fact that the 
long-run capital stock under progressive income taxation is 11% lower 
than under proportional income taxation. 
Turning next to consider a switch from progressive income to progres- 
sive consumption taxes, we may ask two additional questions. First, how 
progressive does the consumption tax have to be to maintain the same 
degree of  wealth inequality,  measured by  the Lorenz curve, as exists 
under a progressive income tax? Second, how is the change in steady- 
state utility and capital intensity between the two systems affected by the 
introduction of  progressivity? 
In answer to  our first question, we find that the values of a  and p which 
must be applied under a consumption tax to provide an identical Lorenz 
curve in the long run to that of  the income tax are 0.104 and 0.432, 
respectively. These translate into the marginal and average tax  rates 
listed in table 13.3. As consumption profiles rise over time, so do the tax 
rates of  all three groups. The marginal tax rates applied to the poor 
person’s consumption range between 0.30 and 0.34. As these rates are 
fractions of consumption, it is helpful in comparing them to income tax 
rates to translate them into fractions of resources used for consumption 
(consumption plus taxes paid on such consumption).  The corresponding 
values are 0.23 and 0.25 respectively.  For median-income households, 
the range is 0.48 to 0.54 (0.32 to  0.35 gross); for wealthy individuals, the 
range is 0.63 to 0.71 (0.39 to 0.42, gross). Interestingly, the top (gross) 
marginal rax rates for the three groups are almost identical to the top 
rates for each under an income tax (0.25,0.35, and 0.42  versus 0.24,0.34, 
and 0.43). 482  Alan J. AuerbachILaurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 13.3  Simulated Tax Rates under Progressive Consumption Taxation 
Poor  Median  Wealthy 
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Table 13.3 (cont.) 
Poor  Median  Wealthy 
Age  MTR  ATR  MTR  ATR  MTR  ATR 
48  ,334  .219  ,529  ,317 
49  ,335  ,219  ,530  ,317 
50  ,335  ,220  ,531  ,318 
51  ,336  ,220  ,533  ,318 
52  ,337  ,221  ,534  .319 
53  ,338  ,221  ,535  .320 
54  ,338  ,221  ,536  .320 

















In comparison to the change in capital stock under proportional taxes, 
a switch to consumption taxes under progressive taxation leads to a lower 
capital stock increase, with the capital stock going up by a factor of  3.06 in 
the current simulation relative to the 3.32 found above under propor- 
tional taxes. Similarly, the welfare gain is smaller.  Each group in the 
steady state obtains a 16% increase in real wealth relative to the 22% gain 
under proportional taxes. These differences result because as empha- 
sized above under progressive consumption taxes there remains an inter- 
temporal distortion  in the choice of  consumption. With consumption 
rising over time, each household’s net rate of return is less than the gross 
interest rate. Our results suggest that efficiency gains of  a switch may still 
be possible, even with the requirement that no generation be harmed, but 
the scope for such gains is clearly reduced by the need for tax progres- 
sivity to address the important problem of  societal inequality. 
13.6  The Effects of Tax Cuts, Government Expenditure, 
and Policy Announcements on Capital Formation 
In this section, we consider the general equilibrium effects of selected 
fiscal policies and also examine how a switch from income taxation to the 
taxation of  either consumption or wages would be affected by a prior 
announcement of  such a policy. 
By assumption, the government is rational and recognizes that its tax 
rate and expenditure paths will affect the economy’s path of  labor earn- 
ings, interest  income, and consumption. Hence changes in announced  tax 
rates and expenditure levels must satisfy the government budget  con- 
straint (9) consistent with the general equilibrium changes in income and 
consumption such government policy choices induce. 
This suggests the following important points about government policy: 
Temporary or  permanent increases in government expenditures necessi- 
tate  changes in the path of tax rates.  The choice of  which tax rates to 484  Alan J. AuerbachILaurence J. Kotlikoff 
increase and when to increase those tax rates will determine the short-run 
and long-run impact of increases in government expenditure on national 
savings. 
Temporary cuts in tax rates holding expenditures constant must be made 
up by increases in tax rates in the future.  Again the timing and choice of 
future tax rate increases will influence the economic reaction to temporary 
tax cuts. 
Balanced budget changes in the choice of tax bases will require annual 
adjustments in tax rates until the economy converges to a new steady state. 
These annual  tax  changes during  the  transition are  likely to  be  both 
inefficient in the sense of generating excess burdens and capricious in their 
cohort allocation of the tax burden of financing government expenditure. 
Announcement today of future changes in tax rates can have important 
implications for current revenue since the current stream of  income and 
consumption may be affected by future tax rate policy. 
13.6.1  Temporary Tax Cuts 
Table 13.4 presents the effect of cuts in tax rates lasting five, ten, and 
twenty years on transition and long-run values of  the economy’s con- 
sumption and capital output ratio. Two types of tax cuts are considered: a 
reduction in the proportional rate of  income taxation and a reduction in 
the tax rate on wage income alone, holding the tax rate on capital income 
constant. As mentioned, temporary tax rate cuts require future tax rate 
increases. The simulations presented are based on the assumption that 
following the period of  tax rate cuts the per capita debt resulting from 
these tax cuts is permitted from that point on to grow at the economy’s 
2% rate of  productivity growth. The base case with which to compare 
these results assumes p = 0.02 and y = 1, and a 30% proportional rate of 
income taxation with no initial government debt. For cuts in the prop- 
ortional income  tax,  tax rates are reduced  to 25% for the period  in 
question. In the case of  wage tax reductions, this tax rate is lowered to 
23.33% for either five, ten, or twenty years; a 23.33%  wage tax rate 
provides the same first year tax revenue reduction that is generated by 
cutting both wage and capital income tax rates to 25%. 
Although taxes are cut initially by over 15%,  table 13.4  indicates fairly 
small responses of  aggregate consumption to  tax cuts of  short duration. A 
five  year  cut in the wage  tax rate leads to only  a 0.5% increase in 
consumption in the first year of  the cut. The reason is simply that the 
majority of  cohorts will end up paying for these current tax cuts in terms 
of  higher tax rates and lower future wages after the five year period. The 
deficit created by this short-term tax reduction has a limited wealth effect 
on the economy. 
4. This rules out the possibility that tax rates are so high initially that lowering them 
increases tax receipts. Table 13.4  Temporary Tax Cuts 
5 Year Tax Cut  10 Year Tax Cut  20 Year Tax Cut 
Base Case  Income Tax  Wage Tax  Income Tax  Wage Tax  Income Tax  Wage Tax 
Year  KIY  C  KIY  C  KIY  C  KIY  C  KIY  C  KIY  C  KIY  C 
1  3.11  34.77  3.11  34.77  3.11  34.95  3.11  34.79  3.11  35.12  3.11  34.69  3.11  35.37 
5  3.11  37.64  3.10  37.98  3.10  37.80  3.11  37.99  3.09  37.97  3.11  37.90  3.08  38.22 
10  3.11  41.55  3.08  41.78  3.09  41.69  3.06  42.33  3.07  41.84  3.08  42.25  3.03  42.10 
20  3.11  50.65  3.05  50.55  3.07  50.59  2.98  50.67  3.01  50.60  2.93  52.09  2.93  50.76 
50  3.11  91.74  3.01  90.81  3.03  91.07  2.87  89.52  2.93  90.19  2.52  86.44  2.69  88.31 
100  3.11  246.93  3.01  244.06  3.03  244.76  2.85  239.56  2.92  241.52  2.41  225.94  2.62  232.11 
150  3.11  664.63  3.01  656.90  3.03  658.80  2.85  644.77  2.92  650.08  2.41  604.87  2.62  624.46 486  Alan J. AuerbachILaurence J. Kotlikoff 
Tax cuts of longer duration have more significant effects on national 
savings. A twenty year wage tax cut increases aggregate consumption in 
the first year of the transition by 1.73% and lowers the national savings 
rate in year 2 from 9.40% to  8.34%.  There is a 15% long-run reduction in 
the capital output ratio from 3.11 to 2.62; the gross wage rate falls by 
5.56% in the long run, while the wage tax rate levied on this lower tax 
base must rise to  39% to finance interest payments on the debt as well as 
future government expenditures. The net wage falls therefore by 15% 
relative to its value in the no tax cut case. 
For each of the wage tax cut simulations the long run crowding out of 
private capital by  one dollar of  government  debt is approximately 52 
cents. The long-run ratios of debt to capital are respectively 0.07, 0.17, 
and .50  for wage tax cuts of five, ten, and twenty years. The 52 cent figure 
reflects  two facts. First, holding gross factor returns fixed, switching 
government tax receipts from the present to the future leads to a reduc- 
tion in government savings but an increase in private savings to pay for 
the higher future taxes., Second, the reduction in the long-run capital 
stock lowers gross wages and raises gross and net interest rates; both of 
these factors induce greater savings. 
Deficits resulting from capital as well as wage tax cuts can generate a 
quite different impact on capital formation in the initial phase of  the tax 
cut. Rather than increase consumption, income tax cuts can lead to more 
national  savings in the short run. In the twenty year income tax cut 
example, the first year national savings rate rises from 9.40% to 9.52%, 
although the long-run savings rate falls from 9.40 to 7.28%. Apparently 
the temporarily  higher net rate of  return induces a sufficiently strong 
savings response that the government deficit actually “crowds in” private 
capital. The incentives to savings are, however, only temporary. As the 
end of  the period of  tax cuts approaches, the impending higher tax rates 
on capital income reduce savings incentives and the income effects of the 
tax cut take hold. In the long run there is a smaller capital stock for 
deficits arising from changes in the proportional income tax rate; the 
long-run higher tax rate on capital income generates  a permanent savings 
disencentive. The long-run degree of  crowding out is approximately 70 
cents on a dollar for each of  these three cases. 
13.6.2 
Increases in government expenditures affect capital formation directly 
by raising the government’s contribution to total national consumption 
and indirectly by altering the expected path of future tax rates. Table 13.5 
describes the effect on capital formation of a 5% permanent increase in 
expenditures under a number of different financing scenarios. The first 
scenario is that the government balances its budget on an annual basis 
and therefore immediately raises tax rates to  accommodate  the increased 
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Table 13.5  Balanced Budget and Deficit Financed 5% Permanent Increases in 
Government Expenditurethe Crowding Out of  National 
Investment by Permanent Increases in Government Expenditures 
Financing  AllAGz  AIlAGIo  AlIAGSo  AIIAGISO 
Balanced budget  -  ,519  -  ,387  -  ,214  -  ,210 
5 year con- 
10 year con- 
stant tax rates  -  .520  -  ,743  -  ,495  -  ,451 
20 year con- 
stant tax rates  -  ,504  -  ,690  -  ,939  -  ,800 
Stant tax rates  -  ,530  -  ,527  -  ,336  -  ,320 
level of  expenditures. Alternatively, the government is assumed to keep 
tax rates constant for five, ten, or twenty years, i.e. use deficit financing 
for these lengths of  time. At the end of  the constant tax rate interval, the 
government is assumed to maintain the current level or per capita debt 
adjusted for growth. In each case the tax rate that is  adjusted is the 
proportional income tax rate. 
Table 13.5 indicates that short-run crowding out of private investment 
is roughly 50 cents per dollar of  government expenditure. Under the 
balanced budget regime, crowding out is 52 cents in the first year of  the 
transition, it is 53 cents under the assumption of  constant tax rates for five 
years, but it is only 50 cents for the case of constant tax rates for twenty 
years. In the last case, the extended period during which capital income is 
taxed at a lower rate promotes savings and “crowds in” an additional 2 
cents of  investment in the first year of  the transition. 
Short-run crowding out exceeds long-run crowding out in the balanced 
budget example for two reasons. First, even in partial equilibrium per- 
manently increasing the rate of proportional income taxation will alter 
the economy’s path of  wealth accumulation; existing cohorts at the time 
of  the tax increase hold assets that were accumulated on the basis of  the 
previously  low  capital  income  tax  rate.  The initial  set of  elderly  in 
particular  find that at the lower net interest rate their assets are large 
relative to their new desired levels of future consumption. They proceed 
to rapidly adjust their consumption levels upward. In the long run this 
consumption of “excess assets” does not occur; all long-run cohorts hold 
assets that were accumulated from birth on the basis of  the lower net 
return to capital. The second reason is that crowding out leads to lower 
long-run capital labor ratios and, in general  equilibrium, higher gross and 
net rates of  return. These higher long-run gross interest rates dampen the 
savings response to the higher tax rates. Although tax rates increase in 
the transition from 0.315 in the first year to 0.318 in year 150, the net 
interest  rate starts out at 0.055 and rises to 0.056 because  the gross 
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In the example of a twenty year, deficit-financed  permanent increase in 
government expenditure, long-run crowding out is 80 cents, which ex- 
ceeds short-run crowding out by  30  cents. The failure to make early 
elderly transition cohorts pay for any of  the higher level of government 
expenditure leaves the economy with a lower long-run capital stock. 
Although consumption in year 1  is lower in the twenty year deficit case 
than in the balanced budget example, consumption in the twenty year 
deficit economy is higher in succeeding years than in the balanced budget 
case, and this lowers long-run capital intensity. 
13.6.3  Effects of  Early Announcement 
of  Future Policy on National Savings 
Early announcement of  future policy changes can significantly alter 
economic behavior in periods prior to the actual implementation of the 
new policy. Given the time required to formulate and enact new tax 
legislation, announcement effects are a serious issue of concern. Indeed, 
the simulation results suggest that the very process of  formulating tax 
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incentives to stimulate national savings can itself  dramatically reduce 
national savings in the short run depending on the particular type of  tax 
incentives proposed. 
Figures 13.6  and 13.7 depict the effect of  announcements in year 0 of  a 
complete switch to either consumption or wage taxation starting either 
immediately, in five years, in ten years, or in twenty years. While the 
national savings rate jumps from 10% to over 40% if the consumption tax 
is  immediately  enacted, the short-run  savings  rate actually  becomes 
negative in response to information that the consumption tax switch will 
occur in the near future. Obviously the anticipated high tax rates on 
future consumption dramatically lower the price of consumption today 
relative to tomorrow producing a consumption frenzy in the short term. 
Announcements of  future wage taxation have the opposite effect on 
short-term savings  rates.  Here the promise of  lower rates of  capital 
income taxation in the near future reduces the relative price of  future 
consumption and immediately stimulates savings. Both diagrams indicate 
that economic behavior changes less in the short term the further in the 
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future is the date of  policy implementation. Yet policy changes that will 
not occur for ten years can still change savings rates in year 0 by over 
25%. 
Figures  13.8 and 13.9 graph the utility paths associated with these 
announced changes in the future tax structure. More distant implementa- 
tion of  the consumption tax relieves initial elderly cohorts of  the heavy 
taxation of  their retirement consumption. Initial young cohorts are, in 
contrast, hit hard by a delay in the switch to a consumption tax. Early 
announcement reduces somewhat the loss in utility of  that cohort unfor- 
tunate enough to  retire immediately prior to the tax switch. The reason is 
that the induced consumption frenzy lowers the capital stock and raises 
the rate of  return these retirees receive on  their savings, providing a small 
offset to  the additional substantial tax burden these cohorts are forced to 
shoulder. 
A similar situation arises in the wage tax case. Here immediate imple- 
mentation significantly lowers the utility of  initial young cohorts because 
these cohorts face higher wage tax rates during their working years and 
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lower gross interest rates during their retirement. Delaying the wage tax 
implementation  causes capital accumulation to increase immediately, 
providing a higher gross wage for initial young cohorts who now face a 
shorter period of high wage tax rates. The short-run increases in capital 
lower somewhat the utility of initial elderly cohorts by lowering the gross 
and therefore net return available on their savings. For announcements 
of  wage tax adoption ten and twenty years in the future, only initial 
cohorts of  the elderly  are adversely affected.  The induced short-run 
capital accumulation raises the gross wage enough to compensate work- 
ers for higher wage tax rates when the switch takes place. 
13.7  Summary and Suggestions for Future Research 
This paper has developed an equilibrium simulation model that can 
evaluate  the effects of  a variety  of  government  policies on national 
savings and the inter- and intracohort distribution of welfare. The simula- 
tions described in the paper indicate that the long-run welfare gains of 
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alleged “tax reform” policies arise to a considerable degree as a result of 
redistribution from earlier cohorts. Pareto-efficient tax reform policies 
do  exist, but involve careful use of  our limited set of tax instruments. The 
current impact of current tax and expenditure policy depends  critically on 
the nature and timing of associated future tax rate changes. A corollary of 
this is that questions such as “what is the effect of government deficit on 
current savings?” or “what is the effect on savings of  capital-income 
taxation?”  are sorely  underidentified.  Informed  discussion  of  policy 
alternatives requires a full description of  the entire future paths of  policy 
choice variables. 
The simulation model can be modified in a number of  different ways to 
conform more closely with economic reality and to investigate additional 
savings policy questions. First, preferences can be extended to include 
utility from the actual level of bequests rather than the utility of descen- 
dents  per se. This feature  will limit the  wealth effects of  deficit policies but 
permit more realistic modeling of the United States economy (see Kotli- 
koff and Summers 1981). Second, the model can be altered to allow for 
costs of  quickly adjusting the capital stock. Summers (1980) and Lipton 
and Sachs (1980) have analyzed such q models in altruistic intertemporal 
settings, but the transition effects of adding investment adjustment costs 
in  selfish life-cycle models may be quite different  because of  the real 
effects on savings of  intercohort  wealth transfers (Feldstein 1977). In 
addition to distinguishing new capital goods from capital goods in place, 
the introduction of other assets into the economy including land, money, 
and housing will improve the predictive capacity of  the model and permit 
an analysis of the effect of  inflation on the allocation of  the capital stock 
between housing and industrial capital goods. 
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Comment  Joseph E. Stiglitz 
The Auerbach and Kotlikoff paper is a tour de force. The authors present 
a simulation model of  an economy in which individuals live for fifty-five 
years and determine their savings by  maximizing intertemporal  utility 
with perfect foresight concerning future interest rates and wage rates. 
The dynamic path of  the economy is traced out over an extended period 
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of time; a number of  alternative tax proposals are considered, and the 
consequences  for each cohort are examined in detail. The analysis is thus 
an order of  magnitude more difficult than that involved in  solving a 
conventional  one-period general equilibrium problem  (which is often 
difficult enough). It is an impressive piece of work. 
Obviously, to undertake a project of this ambitiousness requires some 
simplifying assumptions; as always in economics, there are trade-offs: the 
advantages of  complexity and generality in some directions are partially 
offset by the simplifications and idealizations made in others. The sim- 
plifications and idealizations they employed were, I think, mainly dic- 
tated by the difficulty of the problem they faced: they have chosen a set of 
assumptions which makes what would have seemed an impossibly dif- 
ficult problem into one which  is apparently  tractable. But the conse- 
quence of  this is that the results need to be treated with considerable 
caution. This is particularly true because the authors have not yet had the 
chance to run the sensitivity tests which would allow us to judge how 
robust the various results are. What particularly disturbs me about some 
of  the assumptions  employed  is  that earlier  theoretical  work  on the 
questions at hand has identified a number of parameters that are impor- 
tant in  determining  the magnitude of  the consequences (and welfare 
losses) associated with various tax changes. The parameterizations em- 
ployed in the study include several that have some very special properties 
which seriously bias the results obtained. 
There are several critical assumptions employed in the analysis. First, 
they  use  a  Cobb-Douglas production  function.  Many  results  on tax 
incidence are very sensitive to what happens to the distribution of income 
as the capital-labor ratio changes. Hence it seems questionable to begin 
one’s analysis with a model where constant shares are assumed. 
A second assumption,  which is in fact common to almost all the models 
that have been talked about in this conference, is that capital is perfectly 
malleable, and  capital  constructed  at different  dates is  identical  (all 
capital  is  homogeneous). For a  long-run  model  I  find  that perfectly 
acceptable. But the authors are concerned  about dynamic transition 
paths, and one of  the lessons that those of  us who worked in growth 
theory a number of  years ago learned was that these assumptions con- 
cerning capital may make a significant difference. Although the steady 
states may not be much affected by whether a vintage  or nonvintage 
capital model is employed, transition paths can be very dependent on 
which assumption is made. 
A third property of  the technology which I think is restrictive (although 
I don’t know how restrictive it is) is that there are no public capital goods. 
This limits the ability of  the model to discuss a number of  interesting 
questions.  These are the three critical assumptions on the technology 
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On the consumer side, the authors employ a life-cycle model. First, 
they have explicitly left out bequest savings (in spite of  the importance 
which at least one of  the authors has elsewhere ascribed to bequests). 
Second, there is no social security. Given the importance of the effect 
that the social security program has on savings, the absence of  social 
security is something with which one should be concerned. I will come 
back to the effect this has on some of the conclusions that the authors 
reach. 
A third assumption concerning consumers is that they all have additive 
utility  functions  with  constant  elasticity.  On other  occasions  these 
assumptions have been shown to lead to peculiar and implausible savings 
behavior. 
A fourth assumption, that the elasticity of  the labor supply is zero, 
means that a tax on labor is nondistortionary;  this combined with the 
assumption of  a positive elasticity of savings means that a consumption 
tax is preferred to  an income tax: the simulation exercises simply confirm 
the result which has been built into the model. 
Finally, there is the assumption that money and capital are perfect 
substitutes, that government bonds are perfect substitutes for equities. 
This is clearly a critical assumption in any analysis of  the extent to which 
public debt crowds out private investment. 
The authors ask a number of interesting questions, and they obtain a 
number of interesting results. I have the uneasy feeling in reading these 
results  (a feeling that I’m sure some other people must  occasionally 
experience) of finally becoming an old man: most of  the results which are 
presented as  if they are new were included in what we taught our graduate 
students in the late sixties; many are standard results in growth theory. 
Some of  them are in the literature in articles that I’m sure are long since 
forgotten.  Tony Atkinson and I,  in our book,’  have tried to  keep some of 
these “old”  results alive, but  evidently  with  only partial  success. To 
summarize my overall reaction to the results: at the qualitative level, I 
don’t think there were any results that I found surprising or that I didn’t 
know. On the other hand, one of  the things that theory doesn’t tell us is 
how important some of  these qualitative propositions are. The contribu- 
tion of the paper is to  provide a quantitative  estimate of  the importance of 
these qualitative effects. But because the authors haven’t yet done much 
sensitivity analysis, I don’t know how much to believe the quantitative 
results they present. I just don’t know at this juncture how much sig- 
nificance to attach to their results. 
The first proposition is that a switch from one tax regime to another 
may have significant intergenerational effects. In particular one of the 
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important cautions of the paper is that one should not evaluate alterna- 
tives on  the basis of  what happens to  the steady states. If we know that the 
initial situation is Pareto efficient, then moving from one steady state to 
another obviously is going to involve some amount of  redistribution. 
Indeed there are cases where the initial situation was not even Pareto 
efficient,  but still steady-state consumption  levels decrease with what 
would seem to  be a desirable policy change (say, with the opening of  free 
trade). One of  the major subjects of discussion in the growth theory of the 
late sixties was how bad the earlier growth theory literature that just 
looked at steady states was and how misleading it could be. In that sense I 
welcome the emphasis here on the transition paths. 
One  of the interesting points that the authors raise is that it may be very 
difficult, even if  you know that you’re in a Pareto-inefficient  state, to 
generate a transition that will make everyone better off. For instance, if 
you believe that the consumption tax is Pareto superior to the present 
income tax in some static sense, to go from the present tax system to a 
consumption tax involves a transition. To make the compensations to 
make sure that everybody is better off may be very difficult. In fact, they 
say it may be impossible. In the model they present, their conclusion is 
correct because, as they point out, to do  it in their model would require 
having  cohort-specific tax structures, and in general we do not  allow 
cohort-specific tax structures. But in a model with social security, it is 
easy to make social security payments effectively vary with the cohort. 
We allow the benefits  to change over time:  there is a change in the 
benefits  of  social security security over time which is equivalent  to a 
cohort-specific lump-sum redistribution. We are thus able to engineer a 
Pareto improvement, making sure that everybody along the transition 
path is better off. 
A second point they raise is that temporary increases in taxes have 
effects outside the period in which the tax is imposed. Early announce- 
ments can have significant effects prior to the imposition of  the tax. This 
observation is hardly new. Indeed there was considerable literature in the 
late sixties providing rigorous analysis of  the dynamic consequences of 
the temporary imposition of taxes (anticipated and unanticipated). The 
contribution of  this paper is to  provide some quantitative estimates of the 
magnitudes involved. 
One of  the other points the authors raise is that a consumption tax and 
a wage tax are not equivalent. This appears to contradict the widely held 
view that they are equivalent; the difference, of course, is the effect on 
savings. But there exists the Modigliani-Miller theorem for consumption 
versus wage taxes, which says that a consumption tax and a wage tax are 
equivalent  when the government deficit policy changes in the appropriate 
way. Now the assumptions in this paper, that private debt and public debt 
are perfect substitutes for one another in an individual’s portfolio, are 497  National Savings, Economic Welfare, and the Structure of  Taxation 
precisely the assumptions under which this generalized Modigliani-Miller 
theorem is relevant. I can see no reason why, in switching from a wage to 
a consumption tax, the government would not make the compensating 
changes in deficit policy.  Thus the only  reason  the authors obtain a 
difference between a consumption and a wage tax is that they accompany 
the switch with a change in deficit policy which is not the appropriate 
change. Thus there is a confusion between the effects of a change in tax 
policy with a change in deficit policy. (In their paper they have a particu- 
lar set of rules by which the government changes deficits over time. What 
the authors thus do is to show us the consequences of a change in tax 
policy if the government doesn’t alter its debt policy.) Their analysis tells 
us more about the importance of  deficit policy than about tax policy. 
Similar questions can be raised concerning their interesting results on 
the magnitude of  crowding out. As they point out, these results seem 
particularly sensitive to the implicit assumptions relating to  the particular 
pattern of debt policy they assume the government is going to  pursue (as 
well as to the particular assumptions about the substitutibility of debt and 
capital). 
Another interesting  numerical result  that they obtain is that in the 
switch to the consumption tax, two-thirds of the steady-state gain repre- 
sent a redistribution from earlier generations and only one-third repre- 
sents efficiency gains. One again knows from the literature  precisely what 
conditions will determine the magnitude of the efficiency gain associated 
with switching from an income tax to a consumption tax. That is to say, 
one knows that a consumption tax is optimal (a)  if  the labor supply is 
inelastic or (b)  even if  it is elastic, if the marginal rates of  substitution 
between consumption  at different dates  are independent of the amount of 
labor that individuals consume. These conditions are both satisfied in 
their model. Their assumptions thus clearly bias the results they obtain. 
Again, because of  the lack of  sensitivity analysis, one cannot tell how 
important quantitatively  these biases are. But it is important in  their 
future work that the authors focus on parameterizations  which at least 
allow the possibility that the consumption tax is not optimal. Unfortu- 
nately, this requires that they employ utility functions in which leisure 
and consumption are not separable. 
Let me conclude by mentioning two other points. First, a progressive 
consumption tax is distortionary, unless you  have lifetime  averaging; 
consumption at different dates will be subjected to different marginal tax 
rates. Second, one of  the important results of  the earlier  theoretical 
literature is that one can get very close to a utilitarian optimum with a 
linear income tax or  a linear consumption tax, and that the deviation from 
the welfare optimum will be a function of  the degree of nonconstancy in 
the elasticity of the relevant consumption functions. That is, if you have a 
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solution by a linear tax structure. Thus the model they employ, with a 
constant-elasticity utility function, biases the analyses, perhaps strongly, 
in favor of  a linear tax structure. (This would greatly simplify the tax 
structure and solve a lot of  the problems presently facing tax authorities.) 
Thus, while the authors  have accomplished a tour de force in providing 
us with a dynamic, life-cycle simulation model within which the effects of 
certain tax policies may  be analyzed, tractability has forced  them to 
employ  a  number  of  assumptions  which  seriously  bias  the  results 
obtained. In their future work, I hope the authors can extend the model 
by testing the sensitivity of  their model and the robustness of the results. 
In doing so, let me encourage them in particular to  focus their efforts on 
investigating  the effect of  altering those parameters which theoretical 
analysis has shown to be critical in determining, for instance, the desira- 
bility of  consumption versus income taxation. 